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BY JEFFREY T. WENNAR AND JAMIE BRINKMEYER PERRY
Cellular Telephones and the Fourth Amendment
Cellular telephones (“cell phones”) provide their users with immediate access and connectivity, and this has become the expectation of the majority of society. Cell phones allow users to communicate by 
way of actual conversations, text messages, and email. As a re-
sult, most cell phones store a wealth of in-
formation: contact names, phone numbers 
and addresses, recently called numbers, 
emails, text messages, and photographs. 
The majority of cell phone use is for a legal 
purpose but unfortunately, cell phones are 
also used in conjunction with criminal ac-
tivity. This raises the question of whether 
the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment is applicable to a cell phone seized 
incident to an arrest. The inquiry also ques-
tions whether there is an acceptable period of time within which 
law enforcement can examine a cell phone incident to an arrest 
before a search warrant is required.
DISCUSSION
I. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES 
INCIDENT TO ARRESTS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL, AS 
LONG AS THEY ARE PURSUANT TO A VALID ARREST, 
CONTEMPORANEOUS TO THAT ARREST, AND 
REASONABLE IN SCOPE.
Warrantless searches of cell phones are generally constitu-
tional pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement, 
which allows for searches incident to an arrest. Contemporane-
ous to a lawful arrest, law enforcement officers are permitted 
to search call logs and text messages for evidence that could 
potentially be destroyed before a search warrant is obtained.1 
However, this search must be reasonable, and searches extend-
ing into further areas of the cell phone, such as pictures and In-
ternet browsing history, may exceed the scope of this exception.
The Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires 
that warrants, supported by probable cause, be issued prior 
to searching areas where an individual has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.2 Searches are generally unlawful if they 
are performed without such warrants and if they violate the 
owners’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or area 
being searched.3 Evidence gained from an illegal search will 
be suppressed.4 However, there are excep-
tions to this general warrant requirement.5 
Even when a warrantless search violates 
a person’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, it will be deemed constitutional if 
it falls within an established exception to 
the warrant requirement.6 One such excep-
tion refers to searches carried out incident 
to lawful arrests.7 This exception is based 
on the principle that a person lawfully ar-
rested has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to property taken from 
his person. Contemporaneous to arrest, the government has a 
right to search the person of the accused to obtain evidence of 
the crime.8 However, a search incident to arrest must still be 
reasonable; meaning the need to search outweighs the invasion 
of privacy imposed by the search.9
Over the last forty years, several Supreme Court decisions 
have clarified the scope of this exception. In Chimel v. Califor-
nia,10 the Court explained that this exception applies to a search 
incident to an arrest only when limited to a search for weap-
ons or for evidence that could be concealed or destroyed.11 The 
Court further restricted this search to the arrestee’s person and 
the area within his immediate control.12 Yet shortly thereafter 
the Court extended the scope of this rule, stating that officers 
could search all items on an arrestee’s person, including closed 
containers, without needing to articulate suspicion that the con-
tents of the container are illegal.13 In 1981, the Court addressed 
the search incident to arrest exception as it applies to automo-
biles, stating that it is lawful to search the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle and containers therein when an occupant of 
the car is lawfully arrested.14 The Court specifically noted that 
the term “container” should be interpreted broadly to include 
all objects capable of holding other objects.15 It is worth noting 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant which 
clarifies and limits the Belton rule, although the Gant limitation 
likely does not affect this analysis.16
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While the case law regarding searches incident to arrest 
is generally well established, the Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed issues related to warrantless searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest. Maryland courts have yet to address the issue 
as well. Although there is no binding authority in Maryland, 
decisions from U.S. district and circuit courts from around the 
country provide persuasive authority on this issue, including 
two recent cases from the Fourth Circuit.17
Early cases examining searches incident to arrests with re-
gard to technology focused on electronic pagers.18 Courts con-
sistently held that retrieving the call history from a pager found 
on the person of an arrestee did not violate that individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.19 In United States v. Ortiz, the de-
fendant was arrested for conspiracy to possess heroin, and an 
electronic pager was found on his person.20 An agent on the 
scene recovered phone numbers and written messages from the 
pager.21 The court upheld the constitutionality of this search, 
stating that due to the finite nature of a pager’s memory, in-
coming pages may erase currently saved messages.22 Due to 
the possibility that such evidence may be destroyed, the court 
stated that it was imperative that law enforcement officers have 
the authority to immediately search and retrieve such informa-
tion contemporaneous to an arrest.23 Similarly, the United States 
District Court for the Virgin Islands held that numbers stored in 
a pager on the arrestee’s person could be accessed and recorded 
by law enforcement officers shortly after arrest, likening the 
contents of pagers and cell phones to the contents of a wallet or 
address book.24
Courts around the country have generally applied the logic 
from pager and wallet cases to uphold warrantless searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest. The most commonly cited case is 
United States v. Finley.25 In Finley, the defendant was arrested 
during a traffic stop immediately following a controlled buy 
of methamphetamine.26 A cell phone was recovered from the 
defendant’s shirt pocket and a special agent looked through the 
call records and text messages, finding incriminating messages 
tying the defendant to narcotics use and trafficking.27 The court 
held that this search incident to arrest, including the search of 
the defendant’s call records and text messages, was lawfully 
done to preserve evidence. In making this assertion, the court 
recognized that law enforcement officers on the scene have no 
way of knowing whether messages will automatically delete 
themselves as new messages are received.28 For example, soft-
ware applications such as TigerText allows the sender to pro-
gram when a message or picture will automatically be deleted 
from the recipient’s phone.29 The court reiterated that a search 
incident to arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s 
person regardless of whether that container is open or closed, 
and determined that a cell phone was an electronic container 
subject to this warrant exception.30
Numerous U.S. district court opinions have also upheld 
searches of cell phone contents incident to arrest, often analo-
gizing the search of a phone to the search of wallets, address 
books, and other containers found on a person at the time of 
arrest.31 Many of these courts discuss the dynamic nature of 
cell phone and pager memory, stating that the contents of these 
electronic containers are subject to change without warning, 
thus creating a risk that data could be lost with every new call 
or message received by a particular cell phone.32
Two cases out of the Fourth Circuit provide persuasive au-
thority for jurisdictions where courts have not addressed this 
issue. Both cases cite the need to preserve evidence as justifi-
cation for the warrantless searches of cell phones incident to 
arrest.33 In United States v. Young, the search of a defendant 
arrested for drug trafficking yielded a cell phone, and an of-
ficer on the scene accessed text messages and recorded their 
contents.34 The court upheld the search, noting that the officer 
had no way of knowing if the messages would be preserved and 
thus further analogizing the search of the cell phone to previous 
cases upholding searches of electronic pagers.35 In United States 
v. Murphy, the defendant’s cell phone was recovered from his 
person at the time of arrest, and an officer on the scene found 
incriminating text messages contained within.36 The court cited 
Young, as well as older cases involving electronic pagers, to 
justify the search incident to arrest based on a manifest need 
to preserve evidence.37 The court further noted that it would be 
unworkable and unreasonable to require officers to determine 
the storage capacity of a phone before searching its contents.38
Two courts have departed from this logic by suppressing 
evidence collected from cell phones during searches incident 
to arrest. However, both of these courts primarily scrutinized 
the timing of the searches, stating that they were not contem-
poraneous to the arrest.39 The Lasalle court ended its analysis 
upon determining that the search was too remote in time and 
place from the arrest, later declining to address the constitu-
tionality of the search as if it had been conducted contempo-
raneously.40 Conversely, the Park court included a discussion 
of warrantless searches of cell phones occurring closer in time 
and place to the arrest.41 The court recognized that while a cell 
phone is similar to a pager or address book, the similarities end 
there.42 Modern cell phones often contain calendars, voice mes-
sages, emails, videos, pictures, and Internet browsing history. 
The court in Park stated that the line between cell phones and 
personal computers has grown increasingly blurry, holding that 
because of the quantity and quality of information that can be 
stored on modern cell phones, they garner a greater expecta-
tion of privacy.43 Therefore, the court determined a cell phone 
should not be characterized as a container closely associated 
with the person of the arrestee and should not be searched with-
out a warrant.44
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Other than Park, many courts have yet to address the 
quickly changing technology of cell phones. With each pass-
ing month, cell phone companies release phones with newer 
features, larger storage capacities, and greater Internet brows-
ing capabilities. As technology im-
proves, cell phones become less like 
their pager ancestors and more like 
laptop computers. It is likely that fu-
ture decisions will begin to analogize 
cell phones to computers, affording 
them greater protections due to the in-
creased expectation of privacy. Newer 
phones, such as the Blackberry and 
iPhone, are particularly able to store 
large amounts of information—much 
more than an arrestee could typically 
carry on his person in a wallet, address 
book, or pager. Thus an officer who is 
conducting a search and comes across 
this type of cell phone could easily ac-
cess an arrestee’s Internet browsing 
history, bank records, passwords, and 
emails. It is unlikely that courts would 
allow warrantless searches of this scope to continue, as one re-
quirement of the search incident to arrest exception is that the 
search itself is reasonable. Early decisions addressing warrant-
less searches of laptop computers have shown that courts are 
unwilling to extend this exception to laptops found on the ar-
restee’s person, citing the vast amounts of personal and private 
information stored on such devices.45
In United States v. Arnold, the defendant’s Blackberry per-
sonal digital assistant (“PDA”) was seized from his backpack 
incident to his arrest and then searched.46 The court discussed 
the technology of a PDA, stating that it contains both temporary 
and permanent memory.47 Temporary memory includes applica-
tions such as the recent calls list, while the permanent memory 
contains information that is only altered when changes are im-
puted by the user.48 Following this discussion the court declined 
to decide the evidentiary issue, leaving unanswered questions 
regarding searches of newer technologies such as Blackberries 
and iPhones.49 Although the court did not rule on the constitu-
tionality of the search, its analysis of new cell phone technology 
may provide guidance for future law enforcement procedures 
governing searches of cell phones incident to arrests.
The vast amount of case law on warrantless searches of cell 
phones indicates that these types of searches, reasonably con-
ducted contemporaneous to a lawful arrest, are constitutional.50 
When a cell phone is found close to the arrestee’s person at 
the time of arrest, or inside the passenger compartment of his 
vehicle, officers should be permitted to conduct a reasonable 
search of the cell phone. This search can include call logs and 
text messages, so that officers might preserve possible evidence 
that could be erased without warning. However, as new tech-
nology continues to improve and expand the capabilities of cell 
phones, courts may begin to limit the use of the search inci-
dent to arrest exception as it applies to 
such technology. Accordingly, officers 
should recognize that the scope of this 
type of search should be limited to call 
logs and text messages, as these are 
the areas of the phone that are most 
dynamic and subject to change with-
out warning. The need to preserve 
evidence provides the well established 
justification for a reasonable search of 
this nature. However, a search of other 
capabilities of the phone, such as pic-
tures, videos, and Internet browsing 
history, should be conducted only with 
a search warrant, as this type of evi-
dence is afforded a higher expectation 
of privacy, is unlikely to be destroyed, 
and can be viewed at a later date or 
time. Whenever possible, a warrant 
should be obtained when an officer is unsure if a search will 
extend beyond the scope permitted by the search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES 
INCIDENT TO ARREST MUST BE CONTEMPORANEOUS TO 
THE ARREST, MEANING THAT THEY ARE NOT REMOTE IN 
TIME AND PLACE TO THE ARREST.
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant re-
quirement allows law enforcement officers to conduct searches 
contemporaneous to arrest either to recover weapons or to pre-
vent possible destruction of evidence.51 Evidence obtained as 
part of a search incident to an arrest will be suppressed if it is 
not retrieved contemporaneous to that arrest.52 The term “con-
temporaneous” is commonly defined as “existing or occurring 
during the same time.”53 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor 
courts in Maryland have defined a fixed outer limit regarding 
how much time can elapse before a search is no longer contem-
poraneous to an arrest. Generally, a search will be considered 
contemporaneous if it is completed as soon as reasonably pos-
sible, before the booking process is completed, and if it is not 
remote in time and place. These factors all indicate reasonable-
ness of a search, and Maryland courts have held that such an 
analysis is not rigid and absolute; rather “each case is to be 
decided on its own facts and circumstances.”54
In Preston v. United States,55 the Supreme Court reiterated 
that a contemporaneous search after a lawful arrest is permis-
sible to search for weapons and to recover evidence of the crime 
It is likely that future 
decisions will begin to 
analogize cell phones 
to computers, affording 
them greater protections 
due to the increased 
expectation of privacy.
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before it can be destroyed.56 If such a search is so remote in time 
and place that these two justifications are no longer a concern, 
then the search is no longer considered contemporaneous and 
is unconstitutional.57 It is unreasonable to conduct a warrant-
less search that does not fall under these justifications, and such 
searches are not lawful.
Courts have typically allowed more time for searches of the 
arrestee’s person and items closely associated with his person, 
while limiting the time allowed to search other personal effects 
such as luggage. In United States v. Edwards,58 the Supreme 
Court held that searches of an arrestee’s person and articles im-
mediately associated with that person, such as purses or back-
packs, may occur either at the time of arrest or when the arrestee 
arrives at the place of detention, but before booking procedures 
are completed.59 Edwards was arrested around 11:00 p.m. and 
taken to jail, where he remained in his own clothing until the 
next morning because no substitute clothes were available at 
the late hour of his arrival.60 The next morning, his clothing was 
taken for laboratory analysis without a warrant.61 The Court held 
that effects closely associated with his person at the time and 
place of detention may be searched without a warrant, stating 
that it would have been unreasonable to leave him with no cloth-
ing in order to effectuate the search.62 As this was not an undue 
or unreasonable delay, the warrantless search was valid because 
the officers completed it as soon as reasonably possible.63 The 
need to preserve evidence was still present, so despite the delay 
in time, the search was reasonable and met the requirements of 
the search incident to arrest exception as defined by the court 
in Preston. However, the Edwards decision does not extend to 
other personal effects not closely associated with the person of 
the arrestee, such as luggage.64
The decision in Edwards appears to be one of the more 
liberal interpretations of the contemporaneous requirement.65 
Maryland courts have not defined a bright line rule regarding 
how much time can pass before a warrantless search is no longer 
contemporaneous to arrest, but courts since Edwards have not 
allowed significant periods of time to pass. Guidance from the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals indicates that if a search 
closely anticipates, contemporaneously parallels, or shortly fol-
lows an arrest, then it satisfies the requirements of the search 
incident to arrest requirement.66 Subsequent decisions in Mary-
land indicate that a search must simply be “essentially contem-
poraneous.”67 A search incident to arrest will not be considered 
contemporaneous if there is any undue delay.68 Because there 
is no fixed outer limit regarding time between an arrest and 
a search incident to that arrest, courts must weigh the many 
factors involved including time elapsed, change of location, 
continued need to collect weapons or preserve evidence, and 
reasonableness of delays.
In Preston v. State,69 the court suppressed evidence col-
lected during a warrantless search that occurred two to three 
hours following the defendant’s arrest because the search was 
not essentially contemporaneous.70 Upon arrest of the defendant, 
officers transported the defendant’s car to a police garage before 
it was searched, rather than searching the car in the parking 
lot where the defendant was taken into custody.71 The detective 
conducting the search stated that it was conducted in the police 
garage because it was “just more convenient.”72 The court stated 
that there was no doubt law enforcement could have conducted 
the search in the parking lot and that by moving the car, they 
made no attempt to satisfy reasonable promptness and thus cre-
ated an undue delay.73 The court indicated that its decision may 
have been different if the arrestee’s person or items immediately 
associated with the arrestee’s person had been searched after 
transportation to the police station, but they did not state with 
certainty that a delay of two to three hours would be essentially 
contemporaneous.74
In some instances, a search may be deemed contemporane-
ous to arrest even when it is not conducted at the scene or when 
there is a delay, as long as that delay is reasonable. In Terrell 
v. State,75 the court upheld as a search incident to arrest that 
of a vehicle that had been towed to the police station.76 At the 
scene of arrest it was dark and raining, the officers did not have 
the proper means of illumination to search the vehicle, and the 
station was less than a mile away.77 The court found that the 
change in location and short delay was reasonable, considering 
that there was no break in the chain of events and the search 
was done with reasonable promptness immediately following 
the arrest. 78
When an officer conducts a warrantless search of a cell 
phone incident to a valid arrest, it must be done contemporane-
ous to that arrest. It must not be remote in time and place, and 
there cannot be an unreasonable delay. Case law indicates that 
if there is a logical reason for a small delay in time or change in 
location, then the search will remain lawful. Officers must also 
consider where the cell phone is retrieved from upon arrest. If 
the cell phone is on the arrestee’s person or located in a purse or 
backpack closely associated with the arrestee’s person, the of-
ficer may have more leeway as long as the warrantless search is 
completed before the booking process is finished. On the other 
hand, if the cell phone is found in luggage or in other containers 
simply in possession of the arrestee, delays are more likely to 
be deemed unreasonable.
The term “contemporaneous” is commonly thought to 
mean “occurring or originating during the same time.” Courts 
have stopped short of providing a bright line rule or fixed outer 
limit of time that is deemed contemporaneous, so law enforce-
ment officers must consider several factors when conducting the 
warrantless search of a cell phone. They must consider where 
the phone was found, how much time has elapsed between the 
arrest and search, and whether the phone has been transported 
to a new location. If more than a few minutes have elapsed or if 
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the phone has been transported, officers must consider whether 
there was a good reason for these delays. If the delays could 
not have been avoided and the search is conducted as soon as 
possible, then it will likely be upheld as contemporaneous. If 
the delay was simply created for the searching officer’s conve-
nience, like in Preston v. State, the evidence gained from the 
search will likely be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Warrantless searches of cell phones are generally constitu-
tional under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement. Contemporaneous to a lawful arrest, law enforce-
ment officers are permitted to search call logs and text messages 
for evidence that could potentially be destroyed before a search 
warrant is obtained. Generally, a search will be considered con-
temporaneous if it is completed as soon as reasonably possible, 
before the booking process is completed, and if it is not remote 
in time and place. A search incident to arrest must be reason-
able, and searches extending into further areas of the cell phone, 
such as Internet browsing history, may exceed the scope of this 
exception. As cellular technology continues to improve and as 
cell phones begin to function more like computers, courts may 
find that cell phones should be afforded greater privacy protec-
tions. To prevent the possible suppression of evidence, officers 
should limit cell phone searches incident to arrest to call logs 
and text messages when there is a fear that such evidence will 
be destroyed. When possible officers should also ensure that the 
search occurs within minutes of the arrest, and a search warrant 
should be obtained whenever possible.
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